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Abstract
This study investigates the choice between complementary and parallel alliances in a mar-
ket with vertical and horizontal externalities. One composite goods firm competes with two
components producers, each providing a complementary component of a differentiated com-
posite good. Although the joint profits from a parallel alliance between the composite goods
firm and a components producer are always larger than those from a complementary alliance
between components producers, through Nash bargaining, a components producer prefers the
complementary (parallel) alliance when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently large
(small). Combined with the result that a complementary alliance is socially preferable, our find-
ings provide meaningful implications for antitrust policy.
Keywords: Complementary alliance, Parallel alliance, Nash bargaining, Antitrust policy
JEL classification number: L11, L13, L41.
1 Introduction
Today, strategic alliances are increasingly and widely used by firms in network-oriented industries
such as airline, shipping, multimodal transport, telecommunications, and logistics industries, as
well as firms in non-network markets of compatible components such as personal computers and
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software, ATMs and bankcards, and markets for vacations comprising of airline transportation and
resort hotel stay.
One common feature of these markets is that multiple firms produce competing and/or comple-
mentary products. This feature raises an interesting managerial question of who is the best partner
for an alliance. Furthermore, as these firms act independently, the well known concept of vertical
and/or horizontal externalities exist in the markets. Then, the partner choice by firms, which con-
sequently leads to different types of alliances, causes different impacts on welfare. Therefore, the
partner choices for strategic alliance also raise welfare concerns.
This study investigates the partner choices for strategic alliances in a composite market, from
both a positive and a normative perspective. We consider a simple but common market including a
representative consumer and three firms. The consumer purchases a composite good offered solely
by one composite goods firm, and another differentiated composite good comprising of two compo-
nents, each produced by one components producer.1 We examine the consequences of an alliance
between the two complementary components producers and the alliance between one components
producer and the composite goods firm. The former is characterized as a complementary alliance,
and the latter as a parallel alliance. In particular, we argue whether or not one components producer
should ally with another components producer (its complementary partner), or ally with the com-
posite goods firm (its rival that produces a substitutive composite good), to derive a comparatively
larger profit. We explicitly include a profit sharing negotiation by considering Nash bargaining
solutions.
First, we find that a complementary alliance may be unprofitable, whereas a parallel alliance
is always profitable than remaining independent for the allied firms. As Cournot (1838) pointed
out, if there is no rival composite goods firm in the market, a complementary alliance between
two complementary components producers corrects for a vertical externality by jointly pricing, and
thus, it increases their profits. This is well known as the double marginalization problem in vertically
related markets. However, if there is a rival firm, the correction for the vertical externality also has
an adverse effect by enhancing the price competition between the two composite goods. When the
two goods are less differentiated (i.e., the competition is substantial), this adverse effect makes the
complementary alliance unprofitable. On the other hand, the parallel alliance is always profitable
because it relaxes competition against the rival product by correcting horizontal externalities.
Further, we find that the joint profits obtained by the parallel alliance are always larger than those
obtained by the complementary alliance. However, total profitability alone is not a sufficient deter-
minant of the type of alliance that will emerge. Through the standard approach of Nash bargaining,
we find that when the degree of product differentiation for the two composite goods is sufficiently
large (small), a components producer prefers the alliance with its complementary partner (the com-
1This market structure has a strong similarity with Park (1997), Lin (2005), as well as the structure under parallel
vertical integration in Economides and Salop (1992). As Economides and Salop (1992) indicated, this type of market
structure is perhaps the most common one (p. 107).
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posite goods firm). This results from the fact that the bargaining position of each firm is different,
depending on which firm it allies with and on market conditions. In particular, if a components pro-
ducer allies with its complementary partner, they bargain for the joint profits on an equal footing and
independently of the degree of product differentiation. Alternatively, if the components producer
allies with the composite goods firm (its rival), the components producer’s bargaining position (or
profit on the threat point) is weaker than its rival’s, and this disadvantage becomes larger as the de-
gree of product differentiation becomes substantial. In other words, the components producer may
prefer a type of alliance that yields a lower total profit but a higher share for itself when the degree
of product differentiation is significant.
Our findings on the preference for an alliance partner provide clear and useful managerial im-
plications. In short, for the composite goods firm, allying with a component producer is always
profitable. For a component producer, it is sensible to ally with its complementary partner if the
degree of product differentiation is sufficiently large; otherwise, allying with its rival, the composite
goods firm, is preferable.
Furthermore, because the complementary alliance leads to lower prices by both eliminating dou-
ble marginalization and intensifying competition, it is welfare-enhancing. However, the parallel
alliance is welfare-decreasing because it relaxes competition. Combining these results, our findings
on firms’ alliance partner choices also offer important implications for competition policies, such as
the antitrust policy. First, when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently large, a regula-
tory policy concerning the alliance formation might not be necessary because the welfare-enhancing
complementary alliance will be spontaneously formed. Second, when the degree of product differ-
entiation is intermediate, interestingly, the prohibition of forming a parallel alliance can encourage
components producers to form a complementary alliance. Finally, when the degree of product dif-
ferentiation is sufficiently small, the prohibition of forming a parallel alliance can prevent welfare
reduction. However, this alone cannot encourage the formation of a complementary alliance due to
its non-profitability. In this case, an additional policy (e.g., subsidy policy) for implementing the
complementary alliance can also be socially desirable.
A number of previous studies have considered strategic alliances in composite good markets
where there are both vertical and horizontal externalities. The studies that focused on the comple-
mentary alliance have been provided by Beggs (1994), Lin (2004), Zhang and Zhang (2006), among
others. The studies dealing with parallel alliances in airline networks include Brueckner (2001), Shy
(2001, Ch.9), and Lin (2005) and (2008). However, each of the previous studies assumed that the
alliance partners are exogenously decided and the share rate of the joint profits between the allied
partners is taken as given. Unlike these previous studies, the present study explicitly investigates the
issue of partner choice, and considers the corresponding joint profits sharing problem by introducing
the Nash-bargaining process.2
2Regarding the profitability of a horizontal merger, Salant et al. (1983) construct a Cournot model with homogenous
goods, while Deneckere and Davidson (1985) construct a Bertrand model with product differentiation. Their focus is on
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This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the market structure is presented, and the
equilibrium of the benchmark case (without an alliance) is derived. Then, the outcomes of com-
plementary and parallel alliances with the Nash-bargaining solutions are derived respectively. In
Section 3, the effects of the two types of alliances are examined. The alliance partner preference for
each firm is investigated, and then a welfare comparison is provided. Concluding remarks follow in
Section 4.
2 The Model
Consider a market with two differentiated composite goods. Firm 1 provides a composite good,
composed of components A and B, at a single price p1. Firm 2 (3) provides component A (B) at
price p2 (p3).3 Because we are concerned about strategic alliances in a composite goods market, the
markets for component A or B individually are not included in our model.4 Following Economides
and Salop (1992), the marginal costs for each firm are constant and assumed to be zero.5
Consumers of composite goods can either purchase the composite good (good 1) provided by
firm 1, or combine the two components in a fixed proportion (one unit of each) to form a composite
good (good 23). The utility function of a representative consumer is defined by the following quasi-
linear type:
U(q1;q23) = a(q1+q23)  12
 
(q1)2+2bq1 q23+(q23)2

;
where q1 and q23, respectively, represent the demand for the two differentiated composite goods.
Parameter a> 0, and the condition for the concavity of the function is 0< b< 1.6
The consumer surplus is measured by U(q1;q23)  [p1q1+(p2+ p3)q23]. Note that good 23 is
available at total price (p2+ p3) . Given the prices, the representative consumer chooses the quantity
that maximizes his/her consumer surplus. Now the demand functions for the two composite goods
the profitable merger size (i.e., the number of merger firms), and the corresponding bargaining problem among the merger
firms is not included.
3Our model also applies to the case where firm 1’s composite good is one single product, as well as to the case where
its composite good is combined from several components.
4As Zhang and Zhang (2006) indicate that alliance firms can remain separate business entities and retain their decision-
making autonomy under strategic alliances, our assumption can be justified in a situation where firms can use discrim-
inating price strategies for each single component market. Under discriminating price strategies, the alliance partners
can cooperatively set a total price for the composite goods, while retaining separate decision-making in their own single
component market. For these strategies in airline network markets, see Brueckner (2001), Lin (2004) and (2008) among
others.
5The results are identical for positive constant marginal costs with “price” reinterpreted as the difference between
price and marginal cost.
6This type of utility function has been used in a number of differentiated duopoly studies (e.g., Spence (1976), Dixit
(1979), Vives (1984) and (1985), Sutton (1997), Ba´rcena-Ruiz (2007), among others).
4
can be derived and written as follows:7
q1 =
a(1 b)  p1+b(p2+ p3)
1 b2 ; q23 =
a(1 b)  (p2+ p3)+bp1
1 b2 : (1)
Parameter b can be used as an index of product differentiation. When parameter b is close to zero
(unity), the cross-price effect is extremely small (sufficiently large), which implies that the two
differentiated composite goods are almost independent (perfect substitutes).
2.1 Equilibrium of the Independent Case (No Alliance)
We derive the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium for the benchmark case (Case-I) where no alliance is
formed and each firm independently sets the price of its own product. The profit function for firm 1
can be defined as p1 = p1 q1(p1; p2; p3;b), and the profit function for firm i (i= 2;3) is defined as
pi = pi q23(p1; p2; p3;b). Each firm chooses a price that maximizes its own profits, taking the prices
of the other firms as given. Then, the profit-maximization of each firm is respectively characterized
by the following first-order conditions:
¶p1
¶ p1
=
a(1 b) 2p1+b(p2+ p3)
1 b2 = 0; (2)
¶pi
¶ pi
=
a(1 b) 2pi  p j+bp1
1 b2 = 0; for i= 2;3; i 6= j: (3)
These first-order conditions, which are indeed the reaction functions for the firms, describe the
strategic complementarity and substitutability relationship among the three firms.8 The composite
good of firm 1 and the composite good composed of the components of firms 2 and 3 are substi-
tutes. Thus, p1 and p2 (as well as p3) are strategic complements. On the other hand, because the
components of firms 2 and 3 are complements, p2 and p3 are strategic substitutes. Note that the two
components producers are symmetric in our model.
Solving the equation system (2)-(3), we obtain the outcome of Case-I shown in Table 1. The
superscript “I” stands for the corresponding equilibrium values.
2.2 Complementary Alliance and Nash Bargaining over the Gains
We consider the case of a complementary alliance (Case-C) where firm 2 forms an alliance with
its complementary partner (firm 3) to compete with their rival (firm 1), by cooperatively setting a
total price for their composite good 23. It is assumed that a single decision-maker chooses a total
price for composite good 23 (denoted by p23) to maximize the allied firms’ joint profits (denoted
7Although the derived demand functions are linear, it yields a number of suggestive conclusions that are likely to
hold true in general (Varian 1992, p. 294). Also note that under these demand functions, it is implicitly assumed that the
demand for composite good 23 is the same size as the demand for composite good 1. This assumption is based on the
full compatibility between the two components. The same assumption has been used by Economides and Salop (1992).
8For the definition of strategic substitutes and complements, Bulow et al. (1985) is useful.
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Table 1: Bertrand-Nash Outcomes in Three Cases
Prices Demands Profits
Case-I: Independent ownership
pI
1
=
a(1− b)(3 + 2b)
2(3− b2)
qI
1
=
a(3 + 2b)
2(1 + b)(3− b2)
pi
I
1
=
a2(1− b)(3 + 2b)2
4(1 + b)(3− b2)2
pI
2
= pI
3
=
a(1− b)(2 + b)
2(3− b2)
qI
23
=
a(2 + b)
2(1 + b)(3− b2)
pi
I
2
= piI
3
=
a2(1− b)(2 + b)2
4(1 + b)(3− b2)2
Case-C: Complementary alliance (firm 2 allies with firm 3)
pC
1
= pC
23
=
a(1− b)
(2− b)
qC
1
= qC
23
=
a
(1 + b)(2− b)
pi
C
1
= piC
23
=
a2(1− b)
(1 + b)(2− b)2
Case-P: Parallel alliance (firm 2 allies with firm 1)
pP
1
=
a
2
, pP
2
=
a(2 + b)
6
qP
1
=
a(3 + b)
6(1 + b)
pi
P
12
=
a2(13 + 5b)
36(1 + b)
pP
3
=
a(1− b)
3
qP
23
=
a
3(1 + b)
pi
P
3
=
a2(1− b)
9(1 + b)
by p23), and then these joint profits will be shared through Nash bargaining. In Case-C, the demand
functions change to
q1 =
a(1 b)  p1+b(p23)
1 b2 ; q23 =
a(1 b)  (p23)+bp1
1 b2 : (4)
Correspondingly, the profit function of firm 1 becomes p1 = p1 q1(p1; p23;b), and the joint profits
of the allied firms can be written as p23 = p23  q23(p1; p23;b). In Case-C, there exists only the
strategic complementarity relationship between firm 1 and the allied firms. Similarly, solving the
profit-maximization problems for the two agents in their price setting, we obtain the outcome of
the complementary alliance case shown in Table 1 (Case-C). The superscript “C” stands for the
corresponding equilibrium values.
Now, we turn to solving the Nash bargaining problem for the allied firms. We assume a one-
time-only alliance negotiation, which means that each firm has only one chance to negotiate with
other firms (i.e., one firm). This could be justified by considering a situation where each firm
does not have enough opportunity for bargaining because, for examplr, the deadline for reaching an
agreement is approaching or there are some business practices which restrict free negotiation with
different firms.9 Therefore, the disagreement (threat) point of the bargaining problem is defined as
9The assumption of one-time-only negotiation excludes the possibility of the following recurrence problem: when
bargaining an alliance with firm 3, the threat point of firm 2 may be its profit from an alliance with firm 1, rather than its
profit from staying independent. However, the profit from the parallel alliance with firm 1, as derived later, also depends
upon firm 2’s bargaining power, which in turn, depends upon its bargaining position against firm 3. In other words, the
threat point in forming a complementary alliance depends on the threat point when bargaining the parallel alliance, which
in turn, depends on the threat point when bargaining the complementary alliance, and so forth. Our assumption enables
us to avoid the recurrence problem concerning a threat point of bargaining.
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the profits of firms 2 and 3 obtained in Case I, that is (p I2;p I3). Ub Case-C, firm 2’s share pC2 and
firm 3’s share pC3 of the joint profits (the Nash bargaining solution) can be derived and shown as
follows:10
pCj = p Ij +
1
2
h
pC23  (p I2+p I3)
i
=
a2(1 b)
2(1+b)(2 b)2 ; for j = 2; 3: (5)
Due to the symmetry between firms 2 and 3, each firm obtains an equal share of the joint profits
(i.e., pC23=2) through the bargaining.
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2.3 Parallel Alliance and Nash Bargaining over the Gains
We turn to the case of a parallel alliance (Case-P). In Case-P, firm 2 allies with its rival (firm 1), and
a single decision-maker chooses the price of composite good 1 as well as the price of component
A, to maximize their joint profits denoted by p12.12 In this case, the demand functions remain the
same as in (1). The profit function for the unallied firm (firm 3) does not change, and its first-order
condition for profit-maximization is still represented by (3). The joint profits of the allied firms can
be written as p12 = p1  q1(p1; p2; p3;b)+ p2  q23(p1; p2; p3;b), and the corresponding first-order
conditions are:
¶p12
¶ p1
=
a(1 b) 2p1+2bp2+bp3
1 b2 = 0;
¶p12
¶ p2
=
a(1 b)+2bp1 2p2  p3
1 b2 = 0: (6)
The aforementioned strategic complementarity and substitutability relationships between the allied
firms and the unallied firm in Case-P are also reflected in (6). Solving these three equations, we have
the Bertrand-Nash outcome of the parallel alliance case shown in Table 1 (Case-P). The superscript
“P” stands for the corresponding equilibrium values.
It should be noted that in our model, the two allied firms continue to offer component A at
a reasonable price (p2), so that consumers can still choose the composite good 23. It may be
considered that once firm 2 allies with firm 1, it will refuse to offer component A (i.e., to force
composite good 23 out of the market), so as to ensure the monopoly position for good 1. However,
this is true only in a situation where the market demand for the composite goods is fixed. In our
model where consumers love variety (one major feature of the utility function), it is always relatively
more profitable to continue offering component A, to obtain the profit from composite good 23.
10Deriving the Nash bargaining solution follows the Split-The-Difference Rule of a Nash bargaining problem (See
Nash (1950) and Muthoo (1999)). It can be derived by solving the following maximization problem: max
(p2;p3)2Q
(p2 
p I2)(p3  p I3), where Q  f(p2;p3) : p2 + p3  pC23; p2  p I2; p3  p I3g is the set of possible profit pairs obtainable
through agreement.
11It is assumed that the relative degree of impatience and risk aversion of each firm is identical, implying that the
allied firms equally split the gains from alliance. Thus, the difference in the bargaining position between the allied firms
comes only from the location of the disagreement point. This assumption applies to the parallel alliance case. Section 3.3
considers the asymmetric bargaining power.
12Given the symmetry between firms 2 and 3, the other parallel alliance case (i.e., an alliance between firms 1 and 3)
need not be considered explicitly.
7
Now, we solve the Nash bargaining problem for Case-P. The disagreement point of the bargain-
ing problem in this case is (p I1;p I2). Firm 1’s share pP1 and firm 2’s share pP2 of the joint profits (Nash
bargaining solution) can be derived and shown as follows:13
pP1 = pC1 +
1
2
h
pP12  (p I1+p I2)
i
=
a2(3 b)(54+42b 27b2 28b3 5b4)
72(1+b)(3 b2)2 ; (7)
pP2 = pC2 +
1
2
h
pP12  (p I1+p I2)
i
=
a2(72+18b 33b2 3b3+13b4+5b5)
72(1+b)(3 b2)2 : (8)
Note that firms 1 and 2 obtain an unequal share of the joint profits through Nash bargaining.
This is due to the asymmetry of the profits at the disagreement point between firms 1 and 2 (i.e.,
p I1 6= p I2), and it plays a critical role in leading to comparison results in the next subsection.14
2.4 Effects of the Two Types of Alliances
This section examines the effects of the two different types of alliances. These analyses are use-
ful for an understanding of our main argument of the firms’ preferences for an alliance partner in
Section 3.
The effects of the complementary alliance on market performance can be shown by comparing
the outcomes of Case-C with Case-I in Table 1. In the table, we have the following comparison
result:
pC23  (p I2+p I3) =
a2(1 b)(2 4b2+b4)
2(1+b)(2 b)2(3 b2)2 R 0: (9)
It can be shown that (9) is positive (negative) when b < b¯ (b > b¯), where b¯ 
p
2 p2 t 0:77.
All the other comparisons have also been done by the authors, and only the comparison results are
shown in Table 2 for brevity. According to Table 2, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The complementary alliance between firms 2 and 3
(a) reduces the price of composite good 1. It also reduces the total price of composite good
23. Corresponding to the relatively greater decrease in the price of composite good 23, the
equilibrium output of composite good 1 decreases, while the equilibrium output of composite
good 23 increases.
(b) reduces the profits of the unallied firm. It increases (reduces) the joint profits of the two allied
firms when b< b¯ 0:77 (b> b¯).
13Similar to Case-C, the Nash bargaining solution can be derived by solving the following maximization problem:
max
(p1;p2)2G
(p1 p I1)(p2 p I2), where G f(p1;p2) : p1+p2  pP12; p1  p I1; p2  p I2g.
14It is possible to expect that the outside firm blocks an alliance, for example, by promising to give an allied (inside)
firm a larger share of joint profits if the allied firm dissolves the partnership and allies with the outside firm. This
possibility is excluded in our study by the assumption of one-time-only negotiation.
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Table 2: Effects of Complementary/Parallel Alliances
Prices Demands Profits
Comparison between equilibria of Case-C and Case-I
pC
1
< pI
1
qC
1
< qI
1
pi
C
1
< piI
1
pC
23
< (pI
2
+ pI
3
) qC
23
> qI
23
pi
C
23
! (piI
2
+ piI
3
)
Comparison between equilibria of Case-P and Case-I
pP
1
> pI
1
, pP
2
> pI
2
, pP
3
< pI
3
qP
1
< qI
1
pi
P
12
> (piI
1
+ piI
2
)
(pP
2
+ pP
3
) > (pI
2
+ pI
3
) qP
23
< qI
23
pi
P
3
< piI
3
The intuition behind the lemma is as follows: Due to the internalization of the vertical externality,
the complementary alliance reduces the total price of good 23, and thus forces their rival (firm 1)
to lower its composite good’s price. In other words, the complementary alliance enhances the
price competition between two composite goods, and this causes a decrease in the allied firms’
joint profits. When the price competition is not substantial (i.e., parameter b is small), the gains
accrued by the internalization outweigh the losses due to the price competition, and hence, the allied
firms’ joint profits increase. However, when the price competition is substantial (i.e., parameter b
is sufficiently large), the losses outweigh the gains, and hence, the joint profits of the allied firms
decrease. This is in contrast to the usual result that complementary alliance generally increases the
allied firms’ joint profits (Spengler (1950), Tirole (1988, Ch.4)).
Similarly, we compare the outcomes of Case-P with Case-I in Table 1, to investigate the effects
of the parallel alliance. In Table 1, we have the following comparison result:
pP12  (p I1+p I2) =
a2b(18+21b+15b2+13b3+5b4)
36(1+b)(3 b2)2 > 0; 8b 2 (0;1): (10)
Note that the other comparison results are listed in Table 2. Here, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2 The parallel alliance between firms 1 and 2
(a) increases the price of the composite good 1. It also increases the price of firm 2’s component
and reduces the price of the unallied firm 3’s component. Corresponding to the price changes,
both the equilibrium outputs of the two composite goods decrease.
(b) increases the joint profits of the two allied firms, while it reduces the profits of the unallied
firm.
In contrast to the result that the complementary alliance may reduce the allied firms’ joint profits
(Lemma 1-(b)), the parallel alliance always increases the allied firms’ joint profits. This is because
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the horizontal externality, which exists between firms 1 and 2, is internalized by cooperative pricing
under the parallel alliance, and the allied firms now have room to raise their prices p1 and p2. On
the other hand, this strategic pricing forces the unallied firm (firm 3) to lower its price. Thus price
changes like those in Lemma 2 emerge, and the corresponding changes in outputs and profits can
be obtained.
Finally, we further examine the relationship between the allied firms’ joint profits in the two
different alliances. From Table 1, we have
pP12 pC23 =
a2(16 12b+5b2)
36(2 b)2 > 0:
Lemma 3 The allied firms’ joint profits from the parallel alliance are always larger than those from
the complementary alliance.
Lemma 3 simply indicates that the joint profits which can be shared between the parallel alliance
partners (i.e., firms 1 and 2) are always larger than the joint profits which can be shared between the
complementary alliance partners (i.e., firms 2 and 3).
3 Partner Choice and Welfare
3.1 Preference for Alliance Partners
We discuss each firm’s preference for an alliance partner. According to (7) and Table 1, we have the
relationship for firm 1’s profits as pP1 > p I1, which implies that firm 1 certainly prefers allying with
firm 2 (or equivalently with firm 3) to acting independently.
Now, we discuss firm 2’s preference for an alliance partner. From (5), (8) and Table 1, we have
the following relationships of firm 2’s profits:
pC2  p I2 =
a2(1 b)(2 4b2+b4)
4(1+b)(2 b)2(3 b2)2 R 0; (11)
pP2  p I2 =
a2b(18+21b+15b2+13b3+5b4)
72(1+b)(3 b2)2 > 0; (12)
pC2  pP2 =
a2(36 144b+60b2+18b3 13b4+12b5 5b6)
72(2 b)2(3 b2)2 R 0: (13)
Eq. (11) has the same sign condition as (9), which is determined by the defined value b¯. While (13)
cannot be unambiguously signed, numerical calculations show that it is positive (negative) when
b < bˆ (b > bˆ), where bˆ t 0:29. Here, we can present a figure to demonstrate the preference for an
alliance partner for firm 2.
In Figure 1, the value of parameter b is shown on the horizontal axis. The values of (5) and
(8) are shown by the downward line noted by pC2 and the U-shaped line noted by p
P
2 , respectively.
According to Figure 1, we have the following lemma.
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Figure 1: The Gains of Firm 2 from Different Alliances
Lemma 4 (a) pC2 is decreasing in parameter b, (b) p
P
2 is decreasing (increasing) in parameter b
when b is small (large).
Proof: From (5) and (8), we have
¶pC2
¶b
= a
2[1+(1 b)(1 b2)]
(1+b2)(2 b2)2 < 0; (14)
¶pP2
¶b
=
a2( 81+45b+144b2+72b3+45b4+27b5+4b6)
36(1+b)2(3 b2)2 : (15)
It is obvious that (15) is negative (positive) when b is small (large). Q.E.D.
Lemma 4-(a) simply holds because a larger b implies that price competition is substantial and
this leads to a decrease in the joint profits which can be shared between firms 2 and 3. To understand
the intuition of Lemma 4-(b), we derive
¶ (p I1 p I2)
¶b
=  a
2[3 b+3b2(1+b)]
2(3 b2)2 < 0; (16)
¶pP12
¶b
=   2a
2
9(1+b)2
< 0: (17)
Eq. (16) describes that the difference in bargaining position (threat point) between firms 1 and 2,
which coincides with the difference between p I1 and p I2, becomes smaller, if b becomes larger. Thus
for firm 2, the disadvantage of its bargaining position can be weakened, as b becomes larger (i.e.,
the degree of product differentiation becomes smaller). This turns into a positive effect on firm 2’s
profits. On the other hand, (17) indicates that the joint profits, which should be shared between firms
1 and 2, become smaller, if price competition is substantial, and this causes a negative effect on firm
2’s profits. Then, Lemma 4-(b) holds due to the relationship between the positive and negative
effects.
From the above lemmas, we have the following proposition.
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Figure 2: Nash Bargaining Solutions for Case-C and Case-P
Proposition 1
In a market where one single composite goods firm competes with two components producers (each
provides the component that is necessary for forming a substitutive composite good),
(a) when 0 < b < bˆ  0:29, a components producer prefers the alliance with its complementary
partner, to the alliance with its rival (the composite-goods firm).
(b) when bˆ< b< 1, a components producer prefers the alliance with its rival, to the alliance with
its complementary partner.
Although the parallel alliance yields larger joint profits (Lemma 3), the components producers
might still prefer a complementary alliance. For firm 2, larger (smaller) joint profits in the paral-
lel (complementary) alliance do not necessarily guarantee that it will obtain comparatively larger
(smaller) gains through bargaining with its alliance partner. This is because the bargaining position
of its partner is varies, depending on which firm it allies with and on the market conditions. In
particular, although the joint profits in the complementary alliance are comparatively small, firm 2
can equally share it with its partner (firm 3). In contrast to the complementary alliance, although
the joint profits of the parallel alliance are comparatively large, firm 2 cannot equally share it with
its partner (firm 1), which has a superior bargaining position.
Figure 2 may help us understand Propositions 1-(a) and -(b). In the figure, the disagreement
point for the complementary (parallel) alliance is noted by dC (dP). Corresponding to pP12 > pC23,
the frontier of the joint profits of the parallel alliance (noted by the line pP12) is located farther from
the original point than that of the complementary alliance (noted by the line pC23). In addition, as
parameter b becomes larger, the disagreement point is located closer to the original point, and the
12
difference between pP12 and pC23 becomes larger.
15 Thus, Figure 2-a (Figure 2-b) corresponds to
the case where parameter b is sufficiently small (large). Now, by comparing the Nash bargaining
solution for the complementary alliance case (noted by point NC) with that for the parallel alliance
(noted by NP) in Figure 2-a, the result of Proposition 1-(a) holds. Similar statements apply to the
other case in Figure 2-b, and the result of Proposition 1-(b) holds as well.
3.2 Welfare and Policies for Alliance Formations
Finally, we compare the social welfare of the three cases, and then discuss the policy implications
for alliance formation. Social welfare is defined as the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus.
According to Table 1, social welfare in each case can be derived and written as
W I =
a2(47+21b 24b2 12b3)
8(1+b)(3 b2)2 ; W
C =
a2(3 2b)
(1+b)(2 b)2 ; W
P =
a2(47+b)
72(1+b)
:
Here, we have WC >W I >WP for all b 2 (0;1), which can be shown in Figure 3-a. The welfare
ranking is intuitive because the prices of both composite goods in Case-C are lower, while the
prices in Case-P are higher than those in Case-I. In other words, the complementary alliance is
welfare-enhancing, while the parallel alliance is welfare-reducing, compared to the welfare under
no-alliance. However, as shown in Figure 3-b, the firms do not always prefer to form the welfare-
enhancing complementary alliance.
We consider two types of policy intervention: prohibiting and subsidizing some types of alliance
formation. We assume that the subsidy payments are financed by non-distortionary consumer tax-
ation (such as lump-sum taxes on consumers) and the enforcement costs of both policies can be
neglected. Combining the welfare rankings and the firms’ preference for alliance formation yields
the following proposition.
Proposition 2
In the market,
(a) when 0< b< bˆ 0:29,WC can be achieved under Laissez-Faire.
(b) when bˆ< b< b¯ 0:77,WC can be achieved by prohibiting the parallel alliance.
(c) when b¯< b< 1,WC can be achieved by prohibiting the parallel alliance and subsidizing the
complementary alliance.
Proposition 2 has interesting policy implications for alliance formation in a composite goods
market. When the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently large (region I in Figure 3), gov-
ernment interventions are not necessary because a welfare-enhancing complementary alliance will
be spontaneously formed. When the degree of product differentiation is intermediate (region II), it
15It can be confirmed that (p I1;p
I
2 = p
I
3) is decreasing in parameter b, and (p
P
12 pC23) is increasing in parameter b.
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is socially desirable to prohibit a welfare-reducing parallel alliance. More significantly, this regu-
lation of the parallel alliance can encourage the two component firms to form a welfare-enhancing
complementary alliance. When the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently small (region I
II), prohibiting a parallel alliance can prevent welfare reduction, but that alone cannot effectively
encourage the two component firms to form a complementary alliance because it is not profitable
for them (see Lemma 1-(b)). Thus, in this case, an additional policy (e.g., a subsidy policy financed
by consumer taxation) for implementing the complementary alliance can also be socially desirable.
3.3 Asymmetric Bargaining Power
Propositions 1 and 2 are critically dependent on the process of Nash bargaining. In the case of the
complementary alliance, a symmetry argument could justify the equal sharing. However, in the
case of the parallel alliance, there may be asymmetric bargaining power (as well as asymmetric
bargaining position) between firms 1 and 2.
In the case of asymmetric bargaining power, the Nash bargaining process of forming a parallel
alliance can be described by
max
(p1;p2)2G
(p1 p I1)s (p2 p I2)1 s ;
where G f(p1;p2) : p1+p2  pP12; p1  p I1; p2  p I2g. In this bargaining problem, s 2 [0;1] rep-
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resents the bargaining power of firm 1. This modification affects the value of bˆ and thus Proposition
1. The trivial calculation shows that when s approaches unity, firm 2’s share of joint profit in the
parallel alliance approaches its profit in the independent case (p I2), and thus bˆ also approaches to b¯.
Conversely, the smaller the value of s , the smaller bˆ and firm 2 is more likely to prefer the parallel
alliance.
The difference of the bargaining power in the parallel alliance also affects the welfare implica-
tion of policy interventions (Proposition 2). The derived value of social welfare is independent of
the value of s because s does not affect the price of goods or components, but only affects the
profit sharing between firms 1 and 2. Therefore, we can state that as the composite goods firm
(firm 1) has greater bargaining power against its rival components producer, the welfare-enhancing
complementary alliance is more likely to emerge under Laissez-Faire.
4 Concluding Remarks
This study investigated the issue of alliance partner choice in a market with vertical and horizontal
externalities. In the market, a particular firm has two partners to choose for forming an alliance:
one is its complementary partner who produces a complementary component; the other is its rival
who produces substitutive (composite) goods. We first found that the corresponding joint profits
obtained by the latter alliance are always larger than those obtained by the former alliance. Through
the Nash bargaining approach, we further found that it is always profitable for the composite goods
firm to form an alliance with a component producer. On the other hand, when the degree of product
differentiation for the two composite goods is sufficiently large, although the parallel alliance yields
larger joint profits, the components producers might still prefer a complementary alliance. These
findings provide clear and useful managerial implications for those firms that consider allying with
other firms in a composite goods market.
We showed that the complementary alliance is welfare-enhancing, whereas the parallel alliance
is welfare-reducing. To encourage a welfare-enhancing complementary alliance, a government can
implement the following policies: If the two composite goods are (i) highly differentiated, there
is no need for government intervention, (ii) intermediately differentiated, prohibiting a parallel al-
liance can encourage firms to form a welfare-enhancing complementary alliance, and (iii) slightly
differentiated, the prohibition of a parallel alliance may not be sufficient and a subsidy policy for
implementing a complementary alliance can be socially desirable.
Finally, we discuss the limitations of this study and suggest some directions for future research.
First, cost advantages which may be generated by alliance formations are not considered in our
study. We recognize that there are arguments that merged/allied firms may enjoy a cost advan-
tage.16 Considering the effect of cost-saving through alliance formation remains a subject for future
16See, for example, Perry and Porter (1985), Heywood and McGinty (2008) for merger studies.
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research. Second, full compatibility between the two components has been assumed in this study.
On the other hand, there is discussion on the issue of compatibility (for example, Economides
(1989), Matutes and Regibeau (1988)). An extension for taking the compatibility issue into account
remains for future work. Third, the present network structure is exogenously given and the number
of composite goods producers (components producers) is restricted to one (two). It is meaningful
to consider various types of market structure with a larger number of firms.
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